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INTRODUCTION
States defined by their severe impediments to sustainable development are
designated as “least developed countries” (“LDC”) by the United Nations
(“UN”)1 because they exhibit the lowest indicators of socio-economic
development.2 Socio-economic development is measured by a low-income
criterion,3 a human assets index (“HAI”),4 and an economic vulnerability
index (“EVI”).5 Some of these States include Zambia, Liberia, Madagascar,
Nepal, and the Republic of Tanzania. Based on these socio-economic factors,
the LDCs are often powerless to provide medical assistance to their ailing
citizens.6 International patent agreements, which generally support private
enterprises, coupled with a lack of manufacturing capabilities to produce
pharmaceuticals within the LDC itself further exacerbates this problem.7 As
such, it is not surprising that more than half of all deaths in low-income
countries in 2016 were caused by preventable and treatable conditions, such
as communicable diseases, maternal causes, and nutritional deficiencies.8
While the estimated number of individuals between the ages of zero and
forty-nine suffering from HIV/AIDS in the world was 33.2 million by the end
of 2007, approximately one-third of those individuals are estimated to live in

1. Least Developed Countries (LDCS), UN: DEV. POL’Y & ANALYSIS DIV.,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category.html
[https://perma.cc/NS79-PHHK] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
2. About LDCs, UN-OHRLLS, http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/ [https://perma.cc/TA5K-6E2E]
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
3. LDC Identification Criteria & Indicators, UN DEV. POL’Y & ANALYSIS DIV.,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-criteria.html
[https://perma.cc/ZPE3-VPVY] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (describing that the low-income criterion
is based on a three-year average estimate of gross national income (“GNI”) per capita of $1,025 for
2018).
4. See id. (describing that the HAI is based on indicators of (a) malnourishment, (b) childhood
morality rate, (c) maternal mortality rate, (d) secondary school enrolment ratio, and (e) adult literacy
rate).
5. See id. (describing that the EVI is based on indicators of (a) population size; (b)
remoteness, (c) merchandise export concentration, (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, (e)
share of population in low elevated coastal zones, (f) instability of exports of goods and services, (g)
victims of natural disasters, and (h) instability of agricultural production).
6. See John O. Mugabe, Health Innovation Systems in Developing Countries Strategies for
Building Scientific and Technological Capacities, COMMISSION ON INTELL. PROP., INNOVATION AND
THE PUB. HEALTH WORLD HEALTH ORG. 5 (2005).
7. See Zosia Kmietowicz, Patent Laws Are Keeping Poor Countries in Poverty, 325 BMJ 562,
562 (2002). See also Mugabe, supra note 6, at 7.
8. See The Top 10 Causes of Death, WHO (2018), http://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/the-top-10-causes-of-death [https://perma.cc/M9NW-RA4J] (last visited Sept. 20,
2018).
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LDCs.9 Furthermore, even though LDCs comprise approximately 80% of the
world’s population, these States represent approximately 20% of global
pharmaceutical consumption.10 Access to affordable medications could
grossly reduce the proportion of the LDC populations hit hardest by these
preventable and treatable conditions.11
A beautiful contradiction surrounds accessibility of these medications: the
innovative vehicle used to create these pharmaceuticals is the very means that
limits access to them. That is, promotion of innovation occurs by allowing a
once-patented technology to enter the public domain and be openly used12 but
at the cost of granting a patent owner a limited duration monopoly13 to
exclude others from, “making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States” for a set time period.14 When this rationale is expanded to the
international level, humanitarian issues emerge.
In an attempt to remedy the humanitarian concerns posed by patent
enforcement in the international sphere, the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) was negotiated
and established in 1995 as the “most comprehensive multilateral agreement on

9. Immunization,
Vaccines
and
Biologicals:
HIV
/
AIDS,
WHO,
http://www.who.int/immunization/topics/hiv/en/index1.html [https://perma.cc/EKR3-TV9U] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2018).
See also, Least Developed Countries, UNICEF,
https://www.unicef.org/sowc06/pdfs/regional_stat_sum_s21_ldc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FEW-LX9B]
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
10. Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected
Diseases, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MED. CAMPAIGN AND THE DRUGS
FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES WORKING GROUP, 1, 8 (2001). See also Fatal Imbalance. The Crisis in
Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases, THE ACCESS CAMPAIGN,
https://www.msfaccess.org/content/fatal-imbalance-crisis-research-and-development-drugsneglected-diseases [https://perma.cc/5SED-EZF2] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
11. Cut the Cost – Patent Injustice: How World Trade Rules Threaten the Health of Poor
People, OXFAM GB 1, 3 (2001) (explaining that “much of the premature death and disability
associated with infectious disease could be avoided, and the health gap closed, if poor people had
access to affordable medicines”).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (establishing this clause as the “patent and copyright clause”
since it defines the scope of Congress’ power to enact legislation governing copyrights and patents as
“promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”).
13. These statutory guidelines are based on United States patent law. See 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(2) (2013) (allowing for a twenty year monopoly for a utility patent or a plant patent, which
begins on the date the patent application was filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO)); 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012) (allowing for a fifteen year monopoly from the date of grant of a
U.S. design patent application filed on or after May 13, 2015, and allowing for a fourteen year
monopoly from the date of grant of a U.S. design patent application filed prior to May 13, 2015).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2013) (basing this statutory guideline on United States patent law).
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intellectual property” to date.15 The TRIPS Agreement specifies a minimum
set of substantive standards for procedural regulation of intellectual property
between World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Member States,16 which allows
for protection of inventions in all technological fields upon a finding that the
inventions meet the minimal criteria for patentability.17
As a means to alleviate the suffering of those Members facing a public
health crisis, compulsory licensing language was codified in Article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement.18 Compulsory licensing enables WTO Members to use a
patented technology by third parties without authorization from the patent
holder,19 thus decreasing the LDC’s pharmaceutical drought by increasing its
pharmaceutical accessibility.20 However, Article 31(f) of the TRIPS
Agreement restricts the availability of export drugs made under compulsory
licenses causing problems for LDCs that lack domestic manufacturing
capabilities but desire to import generic copies of pharmaceuticals
manufactured in another country.21
While these public health concerns were placed on the agenda for the
WTO’s Third Ministerial Conference held in Seattle, Washington, in 1999,22

15. Overview:
the
TRIPS
Agreement,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z58N-SW6Y] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2018).
16. ANTHONY TAUBMAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO WORKING WITH TRIPS 110 (Oxford
University Press 2011).
17. Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at 8. See generally TRIPS: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
(hereinafter TRIPS Agreement).
18. See generally id. at art. 31.
19. See id. at art. 31 ¶ 1. See also Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Obligations
and
Expectations,
WTO
(2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/D6KZ7FH3] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (stating that this exemption can only be exercised subsequent
meeting the following criteria: (1) showing an effort was made to obtain a voluntary license from the
patent holder on reasonable commercial conditions and (2) paying remuneration to the patent holder,
taking into account the economic value of the license, in exchange for use of the patented
technology, where the decisions are subject to judicial or other independent review by a higher
authority).
20. See Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Pros and Cons of Compulsory Licensing: An Analysis of
Arguments, 3 INT’L J. OF SOC. SCI. AND HUMAN. 254, 255 (2013).
21. See Brin Anderson, Better Access to Medicines: Why Countries are Getting “Tripped” Up
and Not Ratifying Article 31-bis, 1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 165, 171 (2010).
22. The
Third
WTO
Ministerial
Conference,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/min99_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/CQX7L8CX] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018). See, also
Ministerial Conferences, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y4N6-JJZW] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (identifying the Ministerial Conference
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partial resolution of these health issues did not occur until the WTO’s Fourth
Ministerial Conference held on November 14, 2001, in Doha, Qatar.23 During
the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference, WTO Members adopted a
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (“Doha Declaration”),24 seen by
many, including James Love of the Consumer Project on Technology, as “the
strongest and most important international statement yet on the need to
refashion national patent laws to protect public health interests.”25
Recognizing the gravity of the public health issues plaguing the international
sphere,26 the Doha Declaration clarified some textual ambiguities of the
TRIPS Agreement and affirmed both the inherent flexibility of the TRIPS
Agreement and the right of Member States to take precautionary measures to
protect public health.27
Despite these strides, the Doha Declaration did not adequately respond to
the “Article 31(f) Problem” because it failed to provide a viable solution that
would increase the availability of compulsory licensing for LDCs suffering
from a public health crisis that lacked the ability to manufacture
pharmaceuticals in-house. 28 As an attempt to address this issue, on December
6, 2005, an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, which introduced Article

as the highest decision-making body of the WTO who meets approximately every two years and
makes decisions on all matters under multilateral trade agreements).
23. The
Fourth
WTO
Ministerial
Conference,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/C53X/NCUP] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
24. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) (hereinafter Doha Declaration). See also The Doha
Declaration Explained, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/GE7Z-9LFM] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).; The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement
and
Public
Health,
WHO,
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/ [https://perma.cc/6KD7-GST9] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2018).
25. Views on the Draft Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, CONSUMER
PROJ. ON TECH. (Nov. 13, 2001), http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/doha/ngos11132001.html
[https://perma.cc/V9F8-C4NZ] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
26. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, ¶ 1 (explaining the recognition of “the gravity of the
public health problems afflicting many developing and least developed countries”).
27. Id. ¶ 4 (“affirm[ing] that the [TRIPS] Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO
Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this
purpose”).
28. Markus Nolff, Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health and the Decision of the WTO Regarding Its Implementation: An “Expeditious Solution”?, 86
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 291, 293 (2004).
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31bis, was proposed.29 It was not until January 23, 2017, that the Amendment
was ratified by the two-thirds threshold of WTO Members needed to achieve
formal approval.30
Introduction of Article 31bis31 into the TRIPS Agreement made
permanent the waiver that had been in force since 2003 to empower LDCs
facing public health crises or national emergencies and lacking
pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities to seek generic pharmaceuticals from
other countries under a compulsory licensing agreement.32 However, a fog
surrounded these concessions with regards to the remuneration costs bore by
the LDC to the State exporting the generic pharmaceutical under a
compulsory license.33
A viable economic solution is necessary to address the shortcomings,
textual ambiguities, and deficiencies engulfing international patent protection,
leading to the inability of LDCs facing public health crises or national
emergencies and lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities to obtain
generic pharmaceuticals. This Note poses a solution to this problem via
another Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration,
which provides a mathematical framework to determine when and under what
circumstances a compulsory license should be granted. Furthermore, this
Note contemplates establishment of a WTO subcommittee to oversee this
proposed solution and to ensure compliance with this Amendment. This
concrete solution will drastically improve access to pharmaceuticals for the
LDC’s in dire need of them.

29. World Trade Organization, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Decision of 6
December 2005, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005) (hereinafter Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement). See
also
Amendment
of
the
TRIPS
Agreement,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/MJZ8-E5MW]
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
30. World Trade Organization, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Sixth Extension of the
Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/1024
(Nov. 30, 2017). See also
WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access to Affordable Medicines, WTO (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm [https://perma.cc/3GAJXCWQ] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
31. Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at Annex to the Protocol Amending
the TRIPS Agreement (hereinafter Article 31bis). See also Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,
WTO
(Dec.
8,
2005),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/AZN8-H49S] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
32. WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access to Affordable Medicines, supra
note 30.
33. See Maura Nuno, A Fair Return Approach to Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing, 48
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 395, 399 (2016).
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I. INTERNATIONAL COMPULSORY LICENSING - AMBIGUITIES AND
DEFICIENCIES
A. The TRIPS Agreement
1. Enactment of the TRIPS Agreement
On January 1, 1995, not only did the WTO commence as the largest
international economic organization in the world34 under the Marrakesh
Agreement,35 but the TRIPS Agreement was established with the aim of,
“protect[ing] and enforce[ing] [] intellectual property rights[,] [while] []
promot[ing] [] technological innovation and [] the transfer and dissemination
of technology.”36 Derived from existing intellectual property conventions,
such as the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works adopted in 1886,37 the TRIPS Agreement provides a similar framework
to that guiding the U.S. patent law system.38 For example, the TRIPS
Agreement provides the patent owner a right to exclude other “parties not
having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing for these purposes that product”39 for a term of twenty
years from the filing date of the patent application.40 However, despite these
substantive intellectual property protections, LDCs objected to the TRIPS

34. Anne O. Krueger, International Economic Organizations, Developing Country Reforms,
and Trade, THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/reporter/winter00/krueger.html
[https://perma.cc/87ZL-8BY7] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018); The GATT years: from Havana to
Marrakesh,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/R7KG-JWT5] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018); What is the World Trade
Organization?,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/9VE7-U6B6] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
35. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 (hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement). See also Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April
1994,
WTO
(2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/marrakesh_decl_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/4H2S-VQ6Z] (explaining that the Marrakesh Agreement replaced the GATT
agreement).
36. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 7.
37. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ [https://perma.cc/G3HU-EWLB] (last visited Sept. 20,
2018); Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886),
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html [https://perma.cc/GC6XSJPY] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
38. Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to
Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available
to Third World Countries, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1079, 1105 (2004).
39. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 28(1)(a).
40. Id. at art. 33. See also Part II — Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of
Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
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Agreement for fear of more stringent pharmaceutical patent protection and the
associated price increases of these pharmaceuticals.41
2. Chasms in the TRIPS Framework
WTO Member States have exposed chasms in the foundation of the
TRIPS Agreement. These chasms include a lack of absoluteness associated
with international patent rights, as well as patent right exemptions.42 The
TRIPS Agreement patent right exemptions include (1) a research exemption,
which, despite any patent protection, allows research and testing in
preparation for regulatory approval (e.g., Food and Drug Administration
regulatory approval in the U.S.) prior to the expiration of the patent term;43 (2)
a compulsory licensing exemption;44 (3) an anti-competitive exemption;45 (4)
an exhaustion of intellectual property rights exemption;46 and (5) a public
health exemption.47

41. See Rich and Poor Countries Divided on Patent Treaty, WTO (2006),
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/news20506/en/
[https://perma.cc/F9VX-VMJ6]
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2018).
42. Pharmaceutical
Patents
and
the
TRIPS
Agreement,
WTO
(2006),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5DPB-TND8]
(last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
43. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 30. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003)
(codifying this provision in the United States as the “Hatch-Waxman exemption”); Fact Sheet:
TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Obligations and Expectations, supra note 19; Canada Patent Act
§ 55.2(1) (R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4), WIPO (2013), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8553
[https://perma.cc/GC22-AG8K] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) (codifying this provision as the “Bolar
exemption” in Canada); Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31
March 2004, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EU, 34, 39 (2004).
44. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 31; Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical
Patents Obligations and Expectations, supra note 19 (stating that this exemption can only be
exercised subsequent meeting the following criteria: (1) showing an effort was made to obtain a
voluntary license from the patent holder on reasonable commercial conditions and (2) paying
remuneration to the patent holder, taking into account the economic value of the license, in exchange
for use of the patented technology, where the decisions are subject to judicial or other independent
review by a higher authority).
45. Id. at art. 8(2).
46. Id. at art. 6.
47. Id. at art. 27(2). “Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect . . . including to
protect human . . . health . . . provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by their law,” where this exemption has been interpreted to exclude
harmful inventions for public health interests (i.e., smoking pipes), rather than creating a general
public health exception. Id.
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3. Historical Basis for Compulsory Licensing
Arising in the nineteenth century,48 compulsory licensing has been
historically utilized, “[(1)] to deal with a situation in which a patent owner is
unwilling to work his invention; [(2)] to satisfy an unmet demand from the
public for a patented product; [and (3)] to introduce price-reducing
competition for important but expensive products [(e.g. some drugs)].”49 It is
not surprising that the compulsory licensing provisions have become
commonplace, as justifications for issuing the licenses include protecting local
industry; increasing access to pharmaceuticals and medicinal products; and
reducing an issuing country’s dependence on imports.50 Though it has been
estimated that, “[a]bout one hundred countries [have] recogni[z]ed some form
of non-voluntary licensing in their patent laws by the early 1990s,”51 the grant
of compulsory licenses has been rare in parts of the developed world.52 Under
the TRIPS Agreement, however, the purposes and requirements for issuing a
compulsory license are targeted at allowing States to produce lower cost
generic pharmaceuticals.53
4. Article 31
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows a compulsory license to be
granted on a case-by-case basis, which may be useful in the production of
lower cost generic pharmaceuticals.54 As described supra, “a compulsory
license is a license granted to a third-party by a government,” which allows

48. Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment Help?, 34
AM. J. L. & MED. 107, 111 (2008).
49. GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
126 (Edward Elgar, 2008).
50. Divya Murthy, The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1299, 1307–08 (2002).
51. Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented
Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice
in Canada and the USA, UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., 1, 1 (2003).
52. Dutfield, supra note 48, at 112. See also Ellen FM’t Hoen et al., Medicine Procurement
and the Use of Flexibilities in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 2001–2016, 96 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION BULLETIN 185, 187 (2018).
53. See Toni Johnson, The Debate Over Generic-Drug Trade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(2011),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/debate-over-generic-drug-trade
[https://perma.cc/D3UN-YN7W] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
54. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 252 (2009).
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for use of the patented technology without the consultation of the patent
holder and in exchange for royalties paid to the patent holder.55
Of greatest weight to this licensing framework includes both Section (b)
and Section (f) of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.56 For example, Article
31, Section (b) of the TRIPS Agreement requires demonstration, by a
Member, of prior (unsuccessful) negotiations with the patent owner for a
voluntary license.57 As the public interest associated with accessing patented
medications outweighs the private interest associated with a patent holder
exerting their protected rights,58 this provision is waived in the case of public
non-commercial use or a “national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.”59 Despite the conditions, issuance of a compulsory license
requires “adequate” remuneration paid to the patent holder to account for the
economic value of the license.60 The definition of “adequate” varies based on
the given circumstances, but it is typically less than the potential royalties
freely negotiated.61
However, the most ominous condition, found in Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS Agreement, requires that any compulsory use needs to “be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use,”62 which restricts products produced under a
compulsory license and intended for the licensing Member’s domestic
market.63 Therefore, a State seeking to invoke a compulsory license must also
have the infrastructure necessary to manufacture the sought pharmaceutical.64
As such, Article 31(f) creates problems for LDCs lacking domestic
55. Vishal Gupta, Note: A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis as a
Solution to Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS Agreement, 13 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 631, 639 (2005).
56. Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing
World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 221–22 (2004).
57. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 31(b).
58. Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential
Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73, 77 (2004).
59. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 31(b).
60. Id. at art. 31(h).
61. See James Love, Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on Medical
Technologies, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION TECHNICAL COOPERATION FOR ESSENTIAL DRUGS
AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 6 (2005).
62. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 31(f).
63. Id. See also Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469, 499 (2002) (explaining
that more than 50% of that which is manufactured is for the domestic market).
64. Dina Halajian, Inadequacy of TRIPS & the Compulsory License: Why Broad Compulsory
Licensing is Not a Viable Solution to the Access to Medicine Program, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1191,
1200 (2013).
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manufacturing capabilities and suffering from a pharmaceutical drought.65
Further, Article 31(f) fails to account for States that may need to import or
export products in order to be able to use compulsory licensing at all.66
Several States have utilized the framework provided by Article 31. For
example, in response to the Anthrax scare in 2001, the U.S. government
threatened issuance of a compulsory license for the anthrax medication,
ciprofloxacin, unless the patent holder, Bayer, drastically reduced their
prices.67 Bayer struck a deal with the U.S. government to supply the
medication at a reduced cost.68 Further, in January of 2007, Thailand utilized
this framework to issue a license for a generic HIV/AIDS drug, efavirenz,
produced by Merck.69 Also, in March of 2012, India granted its first
compulsory license to an Indian generic drug manufacturer, Natco Pharma
Ltd, for Sorafenib tosylate, a cancer drug patented by Bayer.70
Other States, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, have
veered away from the compulsory licensing framework and have attempted to
patch the voids of the TRIPS Agreement by engaging in bilateral agreements,
named TRIPS PLUS agreements, to adopt higher standards of protection than
that offered by TRIPS.71 The U.S. has additionally sought to utilize these
heightened agreements domestically for issues relating to anti-competitive
matters.72 However, these TRIPS PLUS agreements represent a shift from the
policy underlying the TRIPS Agreement, which provided that there are no
restrictions on when a compulsory license may be issued subsequent a set of

65. Haochen Sun, A Wider Access to Patented Drugs Under the TRIPS Agreement, 21 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 101, 110 (2003).
66. See id.
67. Reichman, supra note 54, at 250.
68. Jill Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer to Slash by Nearly Half Price U.S. Pays for Anthrax
Drug,
THE
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Oct.
25,
2001),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003966074330899280 [https://perma.cc/8J9U-K2DX] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2018).
69. Thailand Issues Compulsory Licence For Patented AIDS Drug, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE
AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2006), https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/thailand-issuescompulsory-licence-for-patented-aids-drug [https://perma.cc/V2B7-LYH2] (last visited Sept. 22,
2018).
70. Maricel Estavillo, India Grants First Compulsory Licence, For Bayer Cancer Drug,
INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/12/india-grantsfirst-compulsory-licence-for-bayer-cancer-drug/ [https://perma.cc/FE5B-2K8V] (last visited Sept. 22,
2018).
71. Mohammed K. El Said, A Policy Guide for Negotiators and Implementers in the WHO
Eastern Mediterranean Region, WHO AND INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., 15
(2010).
72. Rohit Malpani & Mohga Karmal-Yanni, Patents Versus Patients: Five Years After the
Doha Declaration, 95 OXFAM INT’L 13 (Nov. 14, 2006).
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conditions being met.73 Furthermore, these added protections have failed to
fully remedy the outstanding problems because many terms are ambiguous
and left open to interpretation, such as what constitutes a “national
emergency” or a “circumstance of extreme urgency” under Article 31(b) and
the definition of “adequate” with regards to remuneration under Article
31(h).74
B. The Doha Declaration
Drafted in an attempt to quash “divergent interpretations” on the text and
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration responded to LDC’s
concerns regarding promoting access to affordable medications and further
sought to address the associated pricing concerns.75 The first three paragraphs
of the Doha Declaration acknowledge a need to balance public welfare
interests with the needs of the patent holders associated with the sought
pharmaceuticals.76 Where Paragraph 2 of the Doha Declaration acknowledges
the striking cost of these mediations, making them unaffordable to LDCs,77
Paragraph 3 of the Doha Declaration acknowledges the need for patent
protection for the development of new pharmaceuticals.78
As a strong affirmative statement, Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration
echoes principles that the WHO has advocated by re-affirming the right of
WTO Members to use the safeguard provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to
protect public health.79 Paragraph 4 specifies, “[t]he TRIPS Agreement does
not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public
health. . . . [W]e affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. . . .”80
and emphasizes the ability of WTO Members to enact exceptions to patent
protection for the purpose of increasing access to pharmaceuticals.81

73. Mike Gumbel, Is Article 31bis Enough? The Need to Promote Economies of Scale in the
International Compulsory Licensing System, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 161, 172 (2008).
74. Arun J. Mohan, Worldwide Accountability: The WTO’s Failure to Create an
Infrastructure that Delivers Pharmaceutical Drugs to Developing Countries, 29 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 2001, 2010 (2015).
75. See James T. Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 15 Harv. J.L. Tech. 291, 292 (2002).
76. Mercurio, supra note 56, at 226.
77. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, at ¶ 2.
78. Id. ¶ 3.
79. Id. ¶ 4.
80. Id.
81. Mercurio, supra note 56, at 226.
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1. Paragraph 5
Additionally, Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration82 defines the TRIPS
Amendment flexibilities as: (1) “[e]ach Member ha[ving] the right to grant
compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which
such licences are granted”83 and (2) “[e]ach Member ha[ving] the right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”84
The appeal and facial freedom provided by Paragraph 5 is especially
troubling, as it results in exploitation and importation of non-life saving
pharmaceuticals.85 Moreover, the textual and interpretive ambiguities lead to
inconsistent enactment and use of compulsory licensing.86
2. Paragraph 6 and the “Paragraph 6 Problem”
In response to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement,87 Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration attempted to solve the acknowledged problem regarding use
of compulsory licensing by LDCs suffering from a public health crisis and
having little to no manufacturing ability to produce the pharmaceuticals inhouse.88 Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration acknowledges that “WTO
Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement,” and instructed “the
Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to
report to the General Council before the end of 2002.”89

82. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, at ¶ 5.
83. Id. ¶ 5(b).
84. Id. ¶ 5(c).
85. See Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice, 8 J.
INT’L BUS. & L. 137, 151 (2009).
86. See id. at 154.
87. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 31(f) (which has been interpreted to mean that
most of the products produced under a compulsory license must be intended for the licensing
Member’s domestic market).
88. Current
Issues
in
Intellectual
Property,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_issues_e.htm [https://perma.cc/JZ6U-9F9M] (last
updated Dec. 7, 2011).
89. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, at ¶ 6.
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In 2004, Paragraph 6 was implemented in practice.90 In the absence of
any specific requesting importation State, the international humanitarian
organization, “Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), approached a Canadian
company to produce a triple combination antiretroviral” (“ARV”)
pharmaceutical, including: zidovudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine, to combat
HIV/AIDS.91 In July of 2007, the Canadian company attempted to secure,
without success, voluntary licenses from three patent holders in accordance
with Member State requirements under Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS
Agreement.92
Though not obliged to notify the WTO of an intention to use the system,
in 2007, the LDC of Rwanda notified the WTO of its intention to import
260,000 packs of the combination ARV pharmaceutical.93 In September of
2007, the Canadian company successfully obtained a compulsory license to
export 15,600,000 tablets (the equivalent of 260,000 packs) over a two-year
period.94 The Canadian government then notified the WTO that it was using
the system as an exporting country.95 Though the Canadian company had
offered its ARV pharmaceutical at the price of $ 0.39 USD per tablet, there
were other Indian manufacturers that could supply the product at a reduced
cost.96 However, if Rwanda had received the ARV pharmaceuticals from any
of these Indian manufacturers, Rwanda would not have needed to rely on
implementation of the Paragraph 6 framework because the medication was not
patented in India.97 The Canadian company voluntarily waived the royalty
offered for use of the patent,98 and in the time span of the compulsory license,
approximately 14,413,000 tablets of the ARV pharmaceutical were shipped to
Rwanda.99
However, successful tales like the one in Rwanda are few and far
between. Since the compulsory license needs to be used “predominantly for
the supply of the domestic market” of the Member State, States lacking
manufacturing infrastructure cannot utilize this provision for the importation

90. Fact Sheet: Amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripsfacsheet_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/N5N4-SBDB] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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of pharmaceuticals.100 Despite the optimistic outlook, what has come to be
known as the “Paragraph 6 Problem” arose from these conditions that a
Member State must meet to issue a compulsory license under Article 31(f) of
the TRIPS Agreement.101 Ultimately affecting States with little or no
manufacturing capabilities, the “Paragraph 6 Problem” can be summarized as
follows: LDCs lacking the capability or capacity to manufacture drugs
domestically cannot reap the benefits of international pharmaceutical
compulsory licensing.102
3. Proposed Solutions to the “Paragraph 6 Problem”
Various solutions have been proposed to combat this problem. From
amending Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement (which would be timeconsuming), to creating a waiver system with regards to the requirements of
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement (which would be beneficial but would
require an individual case-by-case analysis and consistent supervision to
prevent abuse), none of these solutions proved fruitful.103 Further posed
solutions have included introducing a dispute-settlement solution, which,
again, prove theoretically applicable.104
A further proffered solution included creating a new exception under
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, posed by some LDCs with a desire to
read Paragraph 6 in light of the entire context of the Doha Declaration and the
TRIPS Agreement.105 Numerous developed countries have argued against this
proposal, emphasizing that an exception would encourage patent infringement
and prejudice rights of those consenting to the TRIPS Agreement.106
Essentially, this exception option would invoke a conflict with Article 21.7 of
100. Mercurio, supra note 56, at 213.
101. Jennifer May Rogers, The TRIPS Council’s Solution to the Paragraph 6 Problem:
Toward Compulsory Licensing Viability for Developing Countries, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 443,
450 (2004).
102. See Alexandra Nightingale, WTO ‘Paragraph 6’ System For Affordable Medicine: Time
for Change?, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.ipwatch.org/2016/11/14/wto-paragraph-6-system-affordable-medicines-time-change/
[https://perma.cc/GJ6X-VTAG].
103. See Rogers, supra note 101, at 453–54.
104. See id. at 455–56.
105. Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health:
Submission by Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH. (Mar. 22, 2004),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/southsubmission.html [https://perma.cc/W76Y-QSFS]; Submission by
the African Group, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and Venezuela, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH. (Sep. 18, 2001),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/africagroup09182001.html [https://perma.cc/49YU-JNYV].
106. Mercurio, supra note 56, at 232–33.
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the TRIPS Agreement, which requires “patents [to] be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field
of technology[,] and whether products are imported or locally produced”107 if
it is invoked with respect to a single technology, such as pharmaceuticals.108
C. Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement - Article 31bis
Despite the call for a solution prior to the end of 2002,109 a resolution to
the “Paragraph 6 Problem” occurred on August 30, 2003,110 prior to the
WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico on September 10,
2003.111 The resolution implemented a collective and interim system where
the requirements of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement were waived.112
Then, on December 6, 2005, the WTO General Council adopted the
Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, which was the first multi-lateral
treaty amendment agreed to by WTO Members since the formation of the
WTO.113 On January 23, 2017, the Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement
achieved formal approval.114 The Amendment inserted a second version of
Article 31, Article 31bis, into the TRIPS Agreement, as well as an Annex and
an Appendix to further clarify this Amendment.115 Not only did introduction
of Article 31bis formalize Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, but Article
31bis made permanent the waiver that had been in force since 2003 to
empower LDCs facing public health crises and lacking pharmaceutical
manufacturing facilities to seek pharmaceuticals from other countries via
compulsory licensing.116 As such, a major implication of Article 31bis
included allowing LDCs to issue compulsory licenses to domestic

107. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 27.1.
108. Mercurio, supra note 56, at 233.
109. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, at ¶ 6.
110. World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540/Corr.1 (Aug. 30, 2003) (hereinafter Paragraph
6).
111. The
Fifth
WTO
Ministerial
Conference,
WTO
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/7Y6B6A9T] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018); What is the Cancún Ministerial Conference?, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_whatis_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/89UU-29G9] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
112. Paragraph 6, supra note 110, at ¶ 2.
113. See Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 31.
114. WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access to Affordable Medicines, supra
note 30.
115. See generally Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29.
116. WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access to Affordable Medicines, supra
note 30.
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pharmaceutical manufacturers, which allows the domestic manufacturers to
export these medications to the LDCs.117
Specifying new guidelines for States seeking to issue compulsory licenses,
Paragraph 1 of Article 31bis explains, “[t]he obligations of an exporting
Member under Article 31(f) shall not apply with respect to the grant by it of a
compulsory license to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a
pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing Member(s)
in accordance with the terms set out in paragraph 2 of the Annex to this
Agreement,”118 where an “eligible importing Member(s)” is defined as (a) a
LDC Member having little to no manufacturing capacity or (b) any Member
that has submitted an application to the TRIPS Council with the intention of
utilizing the Article 31bis system as an importing Member.119 With the
application process, the Member must specify: (a) the specific medication
sought, (b) the quantity of the medication sought, and (c) the State intended to
issue the compulsory license.120 In response, the “eligible exporting
Member(s)” will issue a compulsory license domestically to satisfy the needs
for the “eligible importing Member(s).”121
On the other hand, the “eligible exporting Member(s)” must negotiate a
pricing scheme to remunerate the patent holder.122 The “eligible exporting
Member(s)” must further ensure, in accordance with the generic
manufacturer, that the, “products produced under the licence [are] clearly
identified as being produced under the system through specific labelling or
marking . . . provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a
significant impact on price.”123 Examples of this “specific labelling or
marking” include: (a) an alternative packaging, (b) an alternative shape of the
product, and/or (c) an alternative coloring of the product than that utilized by
the name-branded pharmaceutical.124 Additionally, before the shipment
begins, the licensee must post, on a website, the quantities being supplied to

117. Gumbel, supra note 73, at 162–63.
118. Article 31bis, supra note 31, at ¶ 1.
119. Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶
1(b).
See also, Annex and Appendix to the TRIPS Agreement, WTO (2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_annex_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/HK9B6ZEE];
Notifications
by
Importing
WTO
Members,
WTO
(2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/8FA2-QCVA].
120. Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶¶ 2(a)(i), (b)(i), and (c).
121. Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶¶ 1(c) and 2(c).
122. Paragraph 6, supra note 110, at ¶ 3.
123. Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶
2(b)(ii).
124. See id.
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each State and the alternative packaging, shape, and/or coloring of the generic
pharmaceutical.125 The “specific labelling or marking” of the generic product
is essential to prohibit parallel importation (e.g., to prohibit the generic
pharmaceutical from being circulated in the economies of one or more
“exporting Member State(s)”).126
Despite these enhancements, deficiencies persisted under this modified
framework. First, Article 31bis failed to restrict the type of pharmaceuticals
for which a compulsory license may be granted, which lead to abuse of the
system and importation of non-life saving pharmaceuticals.127 Second, many
States (e.g., Australia, Canada, the United States, and Japan) had opted-out of
being classified as “eligible importing Member(s).”128 This is especially
troubling since these States are unable to utilize the Article 31bis framework
if a public health crisis or emergency ensues at a future time.129 Moreover, the
Amendment failed to provide a formula to determine the monetary scope of
“adequate remuneration” for the patent holder in exchange for use of the
patented technology.130 Moreover, many States failed to notify the WTO of
an intention to utilize this framework due to fears of retaliatory actions or
criticism.131 Furthermore, the Amendment failed to provide enhanced
incentives under an economy of scale viewpoint, where, as production of the
pharmaceutical product increases, a reduction in the overall cost per
pharmaceutical unit would occur, resulting in a lower average cost associated
with producing each pharmaceutical unit.132 These deficiencies make clear
the outstanding need for reform of the current international compulsory
licensing framework.

125. Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶¶ 2(b)(ii)-(iii).
126. Gumbel, supra note 73, at 170–71.
127. See Aileen M McGill, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceuticals: Why a WTO
Administrative Body Should Determine What Constitutes a Public Health Crisis Under the DOHA
Declaration, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 89 (2009).
128. Gumbel, supra note 73, at 171. See also Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, supra note
29, at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, par. 1(b); Annex and Appendix to the TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 119, at n. 3.
129. Gumbel, supra note 73, at 171.
130. Id.
131. Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by
Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 392 (2011).
132. Gumbel, supra note 73, at 171. See e.g., Article 31bis, supra note 31, at par. 3 (assuming
all other requirements of Article 31bis have been satisfied, the language of paragraph 3 permits
developing countries to realize economies of scale if three conditions are met: (1) countries seeking
to utilize economies of scale must be a member of a WTO recognized regional trade agreement
(“RTA”); (2) at least half of the members of that RTA must be on the United Nations list of leastdeveloped countries; and (3) the country seeking the compulsory license is responsible for importing
the medications).
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II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
As a solution to these discussed problems, an Amendment to both the
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration is proposed. The proposed
Amendment would provide a framework and mathematical analysis
universally applicable to quantitatively determine when a compulsory license
should be issued under a given set of circumstances. The proposed solution
includes the following three components: (a) initial inquiries regarding the
State’s current circumstances; (b) a Tier system in which the States are
categorized based on (a); and (c) a mathematical formula to determine if a
compulsory license should be issued to the State based on both (a) and (b).
This proposed solution would define ambiguities present within the
international compulsory licensing framework.
Furthermore, despite being tasked to find a solution to the Paragraph 6
Problem by the end of 2002, the TRIPS Council failed to do so for fifteen
years until the approval of Article 31bis, which still contained deficiencies.
As such, despite the support of one author,133 the TRIPS Council is ill
equipped to remedy these outstanding problems. This Note proposes
establishment of a WTO subcommittee to oversee and ensure compliance with
this proposed solution.
From a practical standpoint, because the TRIPS Amendment was the first
ever to a WTO Agreement since the organization was established,134 this
proposed Amendment would have to clear high hurdles to achieve formal
approval. Specifically, Member States intending to be bound to this proposed
Amendment might express their consent to comply with this proposal in
various ways.135 This expression of consent could occur, for example, by
depositing an “instrument of acceptance”136 with the Depositary Assistant in
the WTO Legal Affairs Division within the period of acceptance, which is

133. Gupta, supra note 55, at 650 (suggesting utilization of the TRIPS Council as an oversight
body with expansive control over the issuance of compulsory licenses).
134. William New, It’s Official: TRIPS Health Amendment In Effect, First Ever to a WTO
Agreement,
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
WATCH
(Jan.
23,
2017),
http://www.ipwatch.org/2017/01/23/official-trips-health-amendment-effect-first-ever-wto-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/64CE-GWPM].
135. General Guidance on Officially Accepting WTO Legal Instruments, WTO.,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/depositary_guide_e.htm [https://perma.cc/BM36-W864]
(last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
136. Id. It should be appreciated that there is no uniform approach for drafting an “instrument
of acceptance” or formalized letter of acceptance, yet it must provide an unambiguous expression to
consent to be bound by the agreement.
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currently until December 31, 2019; as such, for an instrument of acceptance to
be valid, it needs to be deposited by this date.137
The “instrument of acceptance” must contain the following: (a) a clear
identification of the specific protocol by its full title, (b) an explicit intention
by the associated Member State to be bound to it, (c) a date and location of

the acceptance, which is (d) signed, and (e) acknowledges the signor by name
and title.138 The “instrument of acceptance” is typically signed by one of the
“Big Three,”139 but may, alternatively, be signed by another official, provided
that the other official has documentation displaying that one of the “Big
Three” has authorized him or her to issue and sign the instrument.140
Furthermore, the Member State may also have a supplementary domestic
approval process to ratify the proposed Amendment in the associated Member
State.141

137. Id.; How to Accept the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/accept_e.htm#faqs
[https://perma.cc/FRB2-TKWP]
(last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
138. General Guidance on Officially Accepting WTO Legal Instruments, supra note 135.
139. Id. (identifying the “Big Three” as the Head of State, the Head of Government, and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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A. Step One: Initial Inquiries into the Surrounding Circumstances
The proposed framework is multi-pronged and attempts to remedy any
unconscionability by replacing the case-by-case analysis provided by
Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration142 with a uniform system aimed at
determining whether a compulsory license should be granted under given
circumstances. Furthermore, this proposed system removes the following
requirements of Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement: (1) requiring a
Member wishing to utilize a compulsory licensing framework to demonstrate
prior (unsuccessful) negotiations with the patent owner for a voluntary
license, and (2) the waiver system for this provision in the case of a “national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”143
This proposed multi-step framework is depicted in Flowchart 1. The
WTO subcommittee would perform an initial inquiry into the surrounding
circumstances of the State. Description of these inquires will be discussed
infra. Through answers to these pending questions, each State seeking a
compulsory license or “eligible importing Member” is placed into a tier. The
tier system includes three tiers, depicted in Table 1.144

Each tier is associated with a high public health crisis or emergency need,
as this instant proposal only contemplates dire public health crises or
emergency situations. As LDCs, Tier One States are most dependent on
compulsory licensing and have little to no manufacturing abilities to produce

142. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, at ¶ 5(b) (explaining that “[e]ach Member ha[ving] the
right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such
licenses are granted”).
143. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 31(b).
144. This Tier system is designed to help clarify the meaning of “insufficient manufacturing
capacity,” which is not defined in any international agreement or protocol and is furthermore left
unanswered by Gupta, supra note 55, at 648.
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pharmaceuticals in-house.145 As such, States within this tier may receive a
compulsory license under identical circumstances that States in Tier Two146 or
Tier Three147
would not, since States in Tier Two and Tier Three have additional
infrastructure and increased manufacturing capabilities to produce the needed
pharmaceutical. The Tier system further removes the obligations and waiver
regime under Paragraph 2 of Article 31bis for eligible importing
Member(s).148
1. First Inquiry: Analysis of Emergency Situation
The first inquiry of this framework poses the following question: is the
“eligible importing Member” facing an imminent national or public health
emergency?
To remedy the ambiguity Paragraph 5 of the Doha
Declaration,149 which allows each Member State to define these emergency
situations,150 given circumstances will be classified by the WTO
subcommittee as an “emergency situation, a circumstance of extreme urgency,
or a public health crisis” if the circumstances are predicted to “imminently”
affect a portion of the State’s population within a six-month time period. This
definition151 was formalized in light of: (a) the WHO definition of a “public
145. The World Factbook: Appendix B: International Organizations and Groups, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/appendix/appendix-b.html#D
[https://perma.cc/UZE8-KJ6L] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018). See also List of Least Developed
Countries (as of March 2018), UN COMM. FOR DEV. POL’Y & ANALYSIS DIV. DEP’T OF ECON. &
SOC.
AFFAIRS
(2018),
taken
from:
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wpcontent/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2L4-W6HE]; Least-developed
Countries,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/2VLM-KSXC] (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
146. World Factbook, supra note 145. See also Countries or Areas / Geographical Regions,
UN STATISTICS DIV.,
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ [https://perma.cc/EQ92-KKQU] (last visited Sept. 8,
2018) (where these may include developing States or underdeveloped States, which are States with a
less developed industrial base and a low Human Development Index (“HDI”) relative to other
countries. There are no universally agreed-upon criteria for what makes a country developing versus
developed and which countries fit these two categories, although there are general reference points
such as a nation’s GDP per capita compared with other nations).
147. The World Factbook: Appendix B: International Organizations and Groups, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/appendix/appendix-b.html#D
[https://perma.cc/BEK3-GMV5] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018)
148. Article 31bis, supra note 31, at ¶ 2.
149. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, at ¶ 5.
150. Id. at ¶ 5(c).
151. Cf. Gupta, supra note 55, at 650 (explaining that “[i]n order to avoid divergent
interpretations of the agreement and to achieve uniformity in decision, the first portion of the solution
would involve amending the TRIPS Agreement in order to give the TRIPS Council the authority to
review decisions of compulsory licensure and Article 31(f) waiver. The TRIPS Council, acting as a
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health emergency;”152 (b) a current dictionary definition of “imminent;”153 (c)
the Caroline Test;154 and (d) a concern for public health emergencies or crises
affecting remote areas of a State.155
Despite the fact that the Caroline Test is used to determine the
justifiability of anticipatory self-defense under customary international law,
the definition of the necessity factor as an “instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation” is being correlated to the
definition of “imminent.” The six-month time period was selected, since a
shorter time period, such as a three-month time period, would be seen as
“immediately” and a longer time period, such as a twelve-month time period,
would be seen as “distant.” A non-exhaustive list of examples of these
emergency situations, circumstances of extreme urgency, or public health
crises is codified in Table 2 in the Appendix. These narrow circumstances
help ensure that this compulsory licensing framework is not utilized for nonlife-saving pharmaceuticals.
If the “eligible importing Member” does not face an imminent national or
public health emergency, the State may not utilize the compulsory licensing
framework. If the “eligible importing Member” faces an imminent national or
public health emergency, the WTO subcommittee will move the analysis to
the second injury.
central and unbiased body, would decide both when a compulsory license should be issued and when
a public health emergency exists in accordance with the treaty’s language”).
152. Humanitarian Health Action: Definitions: Emergencies, WHO (2018),
http://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/ [https://perma.cc/D9R5-6UPV] (defining a public
health emergency as “an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition, caused by
bio terrorism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or (a) novel and highly fatal infectious agent or
biological toxin, that poses a substantial risk of a significant number of human facilities or incidents
or permanent or long-term disability”).
153. Definition
of
Imminent,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/imminent [https://perma.cc/ADS4-SG3M] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018)
(defining imminent as “ready to take place”).
154. The Caroline Test is a 19th-century formulation of customary international law arising
from the Caroline Affair, which was a diplomatic crisis beginning in 1837 between Britain, the
United States, and the Canadian independence movement. The Caroline Test states that “anticipatory
self-defense” refers to a State’s right to strike first in self-defense when faced with an imminent
attack. To justify such an action, the Caroline Test requires: (1) a necessity factor and (2) a
proportionality factor. The necessity factor describes that the use of force must be necessary because
the threat is imminent. The proportionality factor describes that the response must be proportionate
to the threat. See HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 263–64 (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2015). See also Anthony Clark
Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, 26 THE WASH. Q., 89, 96
(Spring 2003).
155. For this reason, the portion of affected population is not defined so as ensure treatment of
public health crises affecting only a subset of the population (e.g., a disease only affecting
individuals in a remote area of a State).
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2. Second Inquiry: Developed Status of the State
Under the second inquiry, the WTO subcommittee will tackle the pending
issue of whether the “eligible importing Member” is labeled an LDC. An
LDC is defined by the characteristics described supra in Part I, which include
(1) a low-income criterion,156 (2) a HAI,157 and (3) an EVI.158 Currently, there
are forty-seven States labeled LDCs by the UN.159 As circumstances change
between years, a State may lose the LDC title and therefore may be moved
into a different tier. If the State fails to fit within the LDC category, the State
is categorized under Tier Three. If the State fits within the LDC category, the
WTO subcommittee will move the analysis to the third inquiry.
3. Third Inquiry: Type of Pharmaceutical Sought
Under the third inquiry, the WTO subcommittee would elucidate which
pharmaceutical the “eligible importing Member” is seeking. Once the
pharmaceutical is identified, the WTO subcommittee would determine if that
pharmaceutical is an “essential medicine” aimed at directly combating the
imminent national or public health emergency.
To determine if a
pharmaceutical falls into the category of an “essential medicine,” the WTO
subcommittee would assess the following parameters: (a) the severity of the
disease or the emergency, (b) a degree to which the medication targets the
disease or the emergency, (c) an availability of alternative treatments to the
disease or emergency, and (d) the capacity of the patent holder to supply
market demand for the product. Through assessment of these parameters, the
WTO subcommittee could correlate specific pharmaceuticals to specific
diseases or emergency situations. It should be noted that this step does not
contemplate additional medical care associated with the given pharmaceutical,
such as gauzes, crutches, splints, etc.
This step is essential to ensure that compulsory licenses are only issued in
circumstances for pharmaceuticals aimed at directly targeting the imminent
national or public health emergency. This inquiry would further remedy
current abuses of the TRIPS Agreement, which allows for a compulsory
156. Criteria for Identification and Graduation of LDCs, UN-OHRLLS (2018),
http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs [https://perma.cc/5FWJ-SH6Z] (stating that the lowincome criterion is based on a three-year average estimate of the GNI per capita of under $1,035 for
the 2011-2013 time period).
157. Id. (stating that the HAI is based on indicators of (a) malnourishment, (b) childhood
morality rate, (c) secondary school enrolment ratio, and (d) adult literacy rate).
158. Id. (stating that the EVI is based on indicators of (a) population size; (b) remoteness, (c)
merchandise export concentration, (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, (e) share of
population in low elevated coastal zones, (f) instability of exports of goods and services, (g) victims
of natural disasters, and (h) instability of agricultural production).
159. List of Least Developed Countries (as of March 2018), supra note 145.
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license to be issued for non-life saving pharmaceuticals, such as Viagra.160 If
the “eligible importing Member” is seeking a pharmaceutical or treatment that
does not directly target the imminent national or public health emergency, the
State would be unable to utilize the compulsory licensing framework.
However, if the State satisfies this inquiry, the process moves onward to the
next inquiry.
4. Fourth Inquiry: Ability to Produce Pharmaceuticals In-House
Under the fourth inquiry, the WTO subcommittee determines whether the
“eligible importing Member” is competent to produce at least 50% of the
pharmaceuticals sought.
The WTO subcommittee will assess the
manufacturing capabilities of the “eligible importing Member” by looking to
the guidelines of the Appendix to Article 31bis, which explains, “[l]eastdeveloped country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.”161 As such, an LDC
will always be categorized as Tier One. For non-LDCs, the Appendix to
Article 31bis explains that:
Insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in
question may be established in either of the following ways: (i) the
Member in question has established that it has no manufacturing
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector; or (ii) [] the Member has some
manufacturing capacity in this sector, [but] it has examined this
capacity and found that, excluding any capacity owned or controlled
by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the purposes of
meeting its needs.162
This generic and vague framework is insufficient and open to abuse. A
proposed solution to this includes tasking the WTO subcommittee with
determining the manufacturing capabilities of a given State subsequent
analyzing the following parameters: (a) the current manufacturing grossdomestic product (“GDP”) of the State, which will reflect the State’s
production capabilities;163 (b) results of a current global manufacturing

160. Mercurio, supra note 56, at 239.
161. Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at Appendix to the Annex.
162. Id.
163. Analysis: 2016 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index, DELOITTE (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/manufacturing/articles/global-manufacturingcompetitiveness-index.html [https://perma.cc/4K9R-RAKJ]. See also Glossary of Statistical Terms:
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competitiveness index study;164 (c) a percentage of the sought pharmaceutical
produced within the past five years within the State; and (d) a current
production projection of the sought pharmaceutical within the given State.
If the State is capable of producing approximately 50% of the
pharmaceuticals sought, the State is categorized as Tier Two. If the State is
capable of producing more than 50% of the pharmaceuticals sought, the State
is categorized as Tier Three, realizing the need, but not dire need, of a
compulsory license to be issued. Classifying the given State into the tier
system (associated with a need level for the sought pharmaceutical and based
on the States manufacturing capabilities) aligns with the obligations of
Paragraph 2(b) of Article 31bis, which requires submission of an application
associated with an intended use of such compulsory licensing system to the
TRIPS Council.165
B. Step Two: Mathematical Solution
Subsequent to completing Step One, as described supra, the WTO
subcommittee will move onto Step Two, including application of a
mathematical formula to the outstanding circumstances. This mathematical
formula executes a cost-benefit analysis166 by comparing (a) the cost or
economic loss suffered by the patent holder for granting a compulsory license
to (b) the societal benefit achieved responsive to issuance of the compulsory
license. The mathematical formula for Tier One States can be found in
Equation 1, the mathematical formula for Tier Two States can be found in
Equation 2, and the mathematical formula for Tier Three States can be found
in Equation 3, respectively.

Gross
Domestic
Product
(GDP),
OECD
(Jul.
1,
2002),
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1163 [https://perma.cc/663M-F7NU].
164. The study was prepared by the Council on Competitiveness and Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu Limited (DTTL). The predictions are based on an in-depth analysis of manufacturing
companies around the world. See also 2016 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index,
DELOITTE
(2016).
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Manufacturing/gx-global-mfgcompetitiveness-index-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/62ZV-WWD2] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
165. Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶
2(b).
166. Rodreck David, et al., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Document Management Strategies
Used at a Financial Institution in Zimbabwe: A Case Study, 15(2), J. OF INFO. MGMT. (2013).
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and taken together as:
Equation 1.

and taken together as:
Equation 2

and taken together as:
Equation 3.
According to the above-referenced Equation 1, Equation 2, and Equation
3, the variables are defined as follows: is the monetary loss to the patent
holder for issuing a compulsory license. The monetary loss to the patent
holder is assessed based on (a) the variable, or the projected free market
profit for all dosages of the generic pharmaceutical sought and (b) the
variable, or the projected remuneration being paid by the eligible importing
Member for all dosages of the generic pharmaceutical sought under the
compulsory license. It should be noted that the variable fails to take into
account what “adequate remuneration” to the patent holder should be. The
variable will be assessed and determined by the WTO subcommittee based on
the given circumstances. Further, the variable does not take into account
any additional losses to the patent holder, such as loss of reputation, loss of
company equity, etc., associated with issuance of the compulsory license
because these items are difficult to foresee or quantitatively define with
certainty.
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The societal benefit achieved from issuing the compulsory license, or the
variable, is based on the following parameters: , or the number of citizens
affected within the State for a six-month time period; , or an average cost of
the pharmaceutical to assist one citizen; and , or the likelihood that the
national emergency or public health crisis will affect citizens of another State,
which is measured as a percentage. The N factor is estimated based on
epidemic studies, which assess (a) the severity of the emergency or public
health crisis, (b) statistics surrounding individuals within the State affected
previously, (c) statistics surrounding individuals within other States affected
previously, and (d) potential mutations. The variable is estimated based on
an ability of the disease or the emergency circumstance to spread. Further,
the variable is defined as:
, where the variable is the monetary
cost for one dosage of the generic pharmaceutical, and the variable is the
number of dosages needed to treat one citizen.
As such, for Equation 1 (and Tier One States), a compulsory license
will be granted even if the monetary loss to the patent holder is greater than
the societal benefit achieved from issuing the compulsory license for
humanitarian reasons. Since Tier One States are LDCs, which have little to
no in-house manufacturing capabilities, these States are least likely to produce
pharmaceuticals on their own and thus are most likely to be incapable of
remedying the contemplated emergency situations without assistance from
one or more additional States.
In Equation 2 (and associated with Tier Two States), a compulsory
license will be granted if the monetary loss to the patent holder is
approximately equal to the societal benefit achieved from issuing the
compulsory license. In Equation 3 (and associated with Tier Three States), a
compulsory license will be granted if the monetary loss to the patent holder is
less than the societal benefit achieved from issuing the compulsory license,
since Tier Three States are those developed States which have the greatest
manufacturing capabilities and greatest potential to produce the
pharmaceuticals themselves.
1. Example Analyses
Utilizing this mathematical formula, the following example analyses
are contemplated. It should be acknowledged that these are mere examples
and do not include precise numbers or circumstances.
(a) Tier One State
Zambia, a UN-designated LDC and categorized as Tier One, is hit
with a malaria epidemic in 2020, assuming that Zambia is still a UNdesignated LDC in the year 2020. In response, Zambia seeks a compulsory
license from the Indian company, Lincoln Pharmaceuticals, to obtain a
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generic version of Artesunate to combat this outbreak, assuming this company
is the current patent holder of the pharmaceutical in 2020. The variable, or
the free market profit for all sought dosages of the generic pharmaceutical, is
approximately $120,000,000 USD.
Let us additionally assume that the projected remuneration, or the
variable, that Zambia will pay to Lincoln Pharmaceuticals is low due to the
low GDP of Zambia in 2020, at $25,000 USD. The variable, or the number
of citizens in Zambia that are projected to be affected with malaria within a
six-month time period, is 500,000 citizens. Additionally, the
variable, or
the average cost to treat one of these 500,000 citizens is approximately $0.40
USD. Further, each of these 500,000 citizens needs three doses of Artesunate
to combat malaria, and as such, the
variable is three. Based on the
variable and the variable, the variable is 1.2.
Since malaria spreads quickly, the
variable, or the percent
likelihood that the national emergency or public health crisis will affect
citizens of another State, is 70%. With these values in hand, Equation 1
becomes:

As such, even though the
variable, or the cost to the patent holder for
issuing a compulsory license is greater than the variable, or the approximate
societal benefit achieved from issuing the compulsory license, this framework
would allow a compulsory license to be issued to Zambia for the ARV
pharmaceutical, since Zambia is an LDC and a Tier One State.
(b) Tier Three State
Assume now that an anthrax attack occurrs in several middle schools
in Washington D.C. in 2020. Assuming further that the United States remains
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a developed country in the year 2020, the U.S. will be categorized as a Tier
Three State. The United States is seeking a compulsory license from a
Japanese drug manufacturer, Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., for the
pharmaceutical Levaquin to treat anthrax poisoning in children, assuming that
this company is the current patent holder of this pharmaceutical. The
variable, or the free market profit for the sought dosages of this generic
pharmaceutical, is approximately $1,000,000 USD.
Let us additionally assume that the projected remuneration, or the
variable, that the United States will pay to Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. is
higher, due to the increased GDP of the U.S., at $500,000 USD. The
variable, or the number of citizens in the United States that are projected to be
affected with anthrax within a six-month time period, is 100,000 citizens.
Additionally, the variable, or the average cost to treat one of these 100,000
citizens is $0.50 USD. Further, each of these 100,000 citizens needs one dose
a day of Levaquin for sixty days, or a total of sixty doses per citizen, and as
such, the variable is sixty. Based on the variable and the variable, the
variable is 30.
Assuming the anthrax was discovered quickly and therefore it was
estimated that it could be contained, the variable, or the percent likelihood
that the national emergency or public health crisis will affect citizens of
another State, is 10%. With these values in hand, Equation 3 becomes:

As such, since the variable, or the approximate societal benefit achieved
from issuing the compulsory license is less than the variable, or the cost to
the patent holder for issuing a compulsory license, this framework would
allow a compulsory license to be issued to the United States for the Levaquin
pharmaceutical. The standard framework for achieving a compulsory license
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for a Tier Three State is higher than for a Tier One State because Tier Three
States are developed States with higher in-house manufacturing capabilities
and generally higher GDPs.
CONCLUSION
As we share this planet with limited natural resources, supporting the
world’s most vulnerable populations is not only our duty as citizens but is our
moral obligation as fellow human beings. Since the TRIPS Council has failed
to remedy the outstanding deficiencies and ambiguities engulfing international
compulsory licensing to date, a new solution must be implemented to assist
these LDCs for the humanitarian reasons discussed supra. The proposed
Amendment provides both a framework and a mathematical analysis
applicable universally to quantitatively determine when a compulsory license
should be issued under given circumstances. Moreover, creation of a WTO
subcommittee will assist in the oversight of this proposed solution and will
ensure compliance with this Amendment. Until a universal solution is
implemented, such as the one proffered, the citizens of LDCs with little to no
manufacturing capabilities will continuously suffer due to their inability to
achieve generic pharmaceuticals through the international compulsory
licensing framework.
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APPENDIX
Table 2. List of Emergency Situations,
Circumstances of Extreme Urgency, or Public Health Crises
A
Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
Acute Flaccid Myelitis (AFM)
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
Arenaviruses
Argentinian hemorrhagic fever (AHF)
Avalanche
B
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
Bird Flu
Blizzard
Bolivian hemorrhagic fever (BHF)
Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)
Brucella species (brucellosis)
Burkholderia mallei (glanders)
Burkholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis)
C
Campylobacteriosis (Campylobacter)
Carbapenem-resistant Infection (CRE/CRPA)
Chancroid
Chikungunya virus (CHIKV)
Chlamydia psittaci (psittacosis)
Cholera (Vibrio cholerae)
Ciguatera
Clostridium Difficile Infection
Clostridium perfringens (Epsilon toxin)
Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease
D
Dengue fever
Diphtheria
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Drought
E
E. coli O157:H7 (Escherichia coli)
Earthquake
Eastern equine encephalitis (EEE)
Ebola virus hemorrhagic fever
Ehrlichiosis
Encephalitis
Enterovirus Infection , D68 (EV-D68)
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
F
Flooding
Francisella tularensis (tularemia)
G
Giardiasis (Giardia)
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
Granuloma inguinale
H
Haemophilus Influenza disease, Type B (Hib or H-flu)
Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome
Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS)
Hepatitis
Histoplasmosis infection (Histoplasmosis)
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Human Papillomarivus (HPV)
Hydrological disasters
I
Influenza
L
Landslide
Lassa fever
Late blight of potato
Lead Poisoning
Legionellosis (Legionnaires Disease)
Leprosy (Hansens Disease)
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Leptospirosis
Limnic eruptions
Listeriosis (Listeria)
Lyme Disease
Lymphogranuloma venereum infection (LVG)
M
Malaria
Marburg virus hemorrhagic fever
Measles
Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
Meningococcal Disease, Bacterial (Meningitis, Meningitis, Viral (Meningitis,
viral)
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
Mumps
N
Norovirus
P
Paralytic Shellfish Poisoning (Paralytic Shellfish Poisoning, Ciguatera)
Pediculosis (Lice, Head and Body Lice)
Pelvic Inflammatory Disease (PID)
Pertussis (Whooping Cough)
Plague (Yersinia pestis)
Pneumococcal Disease (Pneumonia)
Poliomyelitis (Polio)
Powassan
Psittacosis
Pustular Rash diseases (Small pox, monkeypox, cowpox)
Q
Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)
R
Rice blast
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)
Rickettsia prowazekii (typhus fever)
Rickettsiosis (Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever)
Rift Valley fever (RVF)
Rinderpest
Rubella, Including congenital (German Measles)
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S
Salmonella species (salmonellosis)
Salmonella Typhi (typhoid fever)
Scabies Infestation (Scabies)
Scombroid
Severe Acute Respiratory (SAR) Syndrome
Shigella (shigellosis)
Smallpox (variola major)
Staphyloccal Infection, Methicillin-resistant (MRSA)
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
T
Tornado
Tsunami
Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
Typhoid fever (Salmonella Typhi)
Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii)
V
Varicella (Chickenpox)
Variola major (smallpox)
Vibrio cholerae (cholera)
Vibriosis (Vibrio)
Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis, eastern
equine encephalitis, western equine encephalitis])
Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg)
Volcanic eruption
W
Water safety threats
West Nile Virus
Western equine encephalitis (WEE)
Wildfire
Y
Yersinia pestis (plague)
Yellow fever
Z
Zika Virus Infection

